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Home Sweet Home?! Maybe Not for Parolees
and Probationers When It Comes to
Fourth Amendment Protection
DavidM. Stout'
INTRODUCTION
The founders of the United States Constitution developed the Fourth
Amendment to bring an end to random intrusions by government, which
the colonials experienced when they were under the oppressive rule of
Great Britain. This invasion of privacy by Great Britain acted as a catalyst
for the American Revolution. To prevent a repeat of history under the new
government of the United States, the Fourth Amendment established the
following rights:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the• . 4
persons or things to be seized.
The Fourth Amendment protects fundamental rights and offers different
levels of privacy protection based upon the context in which it is applied.
Requiring probable cause and a warrant offers the highest level of privacy
protection. Generally, both are required for entry into a home to search or
to make an arrest.6 The Fourth Amendment authorizes a reduced level of
protection, requiring probable cause but no warrant when there are exigent
circumstances.' For example, the search of an automobile is considered
I J.D. expected 2007, University of Kentucky College of Law; B.B.A. in Finance,
University of Kentucky, 2oo4. The author would like to thank his wife, parents, and family
for all of their love and support.
2 See generally I WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § .I (4th ed. 2004) ("The
writ of assistance, seldom used in England, was utilized by customs officers to enter and
search buildings for smuggled goods .... Controversy over the writs continued up to the
Revolutionary War .....
3 See id.
4 U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
5 See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714 (1984).
6 See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 576 (198o).
7 See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967).
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an exigent circumstance because, for all practical purposes, only probable
cause is required." When police stop and frisk an individual in public, pri-
vacy protection is reduced even further; only reasonable suspicion that
criminal activity may be afoot is required. These are only a few examples
of the various levels of protection offered by the U.S. Supreme Court's in-
terpretation of the Fourth Amendment. The greatest protection is given
to a citizen's residence.' ° This is the context in which the Ninth Circuit
decided United States v. Scott."
The defendant Scott was a pre-trial releasee." Although he was re-
leased on his own recognizance, he was subject to the conditions of his
release agreement. This release agreement included a clause allowing for
random drug testing and the freedom to search his home at any time, both
without a warrant requirement.' The search condition that was imposed
upon Scott is analogous to the search condition imposed upon the pro-
bationer in United States v. Knights and is similar to the search condition
imposed upon the probationer in Giffin v. Wisconsin." The same type of
search condition is also regularly imposed upon parolees. 16 After Scott, we
have the opportunity to re-evaluate the justifications for these conditions,
8 See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925).
9 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. i (1968).
io See Karo, 468 U.S. at 714; Payton, 445 U.S. at 589-9o.
i United States v. Scott, 424 F3d 888 (9th Cir. 2005), abrogated by 450 E3d 863 (9th
Cit. 2006) The 2006 decision completely resolved the original matter, and the court upheld
its earlier ruling and logic. The author has chosen to continue to reference the 2005 opinion
because the Ninth Circuit analyzed the Fourth Amendment issue in greater detail.
12 See Scott, 424 E3d at 889-9o. Scott had been arrested for drug crimes. He was released
on his own recognizance subject to both search and drug testing conditions. Based upon
a tip that was not sufficient to establish probable cause, officers went to Scott's home and
administered a urine test. After failing the test, officers searched Scott's home, eventually
turning up an unregistered shotgun. Scott was charged with possession of an unregistered
shotgun, but challenged the search uncovering the shotgun based on his Fourth Amendment
rights. See id.
13 Seeid. at 889 ("Among the conditions of his release was consent to 'random' drug testing
'anytime of the day or night by any peace officer without a warrant,' and to having his home
searched for drugs 'by any peace officer anytime[,] day or night[,] without a warrant."').
14 United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. I1z (2001) ("A California court's order sentencing
respondent Knights to probation for a drug offense included the condition that Knights
submit to search at anytime, with or without a search or arrest warrant or reasonable cause, by
any probation or law enforcement office.").
15 Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987) ("Wisconsin law places probationers in the
legal custody of the State Department of Health and Social Services and renders them 'subject
to ... conditions set by the ... rules and regulations established by the department.' One such
regulation permits any probation officer to search a probationer's home without a warrant as
long as there are 'reasonable grounds' to believe the presence of contraband.").
i6 See Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193 (2oo6); Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 E2d 246 (9th
Cir. 1975); U.S. PAROLE COMM'N, RULES AND PROCEDURES MANUAL § 2.204 (b)(2)(iv) (2003),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/uspc/rules-procedures/rulesmanual.htm.
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because all of the cases share a common thread-a reduced level of Fourth
Amendment protection. There is also a renewed need to re-evaluate the
conditions placed on probationers and parolees as evidenced by President
Bush's acknowledgment of prisoner re-entry into society in his 2004 State
of the Union Address. In his speech, the president proposed a four-year,
$300 million initiative to help inmates return to society through commu-18
nity support. The recent decision of United States v. Booker, which ruled
mandatory sentencing guidelines unconstitutional, further accentuates the
need to re-evaluate what is necessary and, more importantly, what is effec-
tive for rehabilitation of parolees and probationers, because in the wake of
the decision, the volume of both is likely to increase."'
The purpose of this Note is to explore an alternative approach for deal-
ing with the dichotomy between respecting a degree of privacy-rights
protection granted to probationers and parolees under the Fourth Amend-
ment and the right of society to exist free of recidivist violence. The Fourth
Amendment analysis of residential searches of probationers and parolees
begins with an overview of the relevant cases to establish their theoreti-
cal relationship to the decision in Scott.2 ° Furthermore, the primary focus
is which Fourth Amendment interpretation is best suited for determining
the rights of probationers and parolees and why courts apply these differ-21
ent interpretations. Detailed analysis of Scott and comparison with previ-
ous cases follows."2 A synopsis of the federal probation system, combined
with current research in the areas of probation and parole, addresses how
the courts and society as a whole should acknowledge the changing needs
of probationer and parolee rehabilitation. 3 By recognizing the changing
needs, courts will be better able to determine whether potentially harsh
Fourth Amendment limitations are actually necessary and whether they
assist or inhibit the goals of rehabilitation. Alternatives to present Fourth
Amendment protection are explored by applying the analysis from Scott."
Finally, the importance of Fourth Amendment protection with respect to
one's residence and how privacy relates to rehabilitation and reintegration
17 See Joan Petersilia, What Works in Prisoner Reentry? Reviewing and Questioning the
Evidence, 68 FED. PROBATION 2 (Sept. 2004), available at http://www.uscourts.govlfedprob/
Septemberz2oo4/whatworks.html.
I8 See id.
19 See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005); H.R. Doc. No. io9-IO, at 4 (2005)
(statement of Rep. Mark Souder), available at http:/lfrwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.
cgi?dbname= io9_-house-hearings&docid=f:2o377.pdf.
20 See infra notes 28-154 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 28-154 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 155-83 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 184-97 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 2 12-24 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 198-211 and accompanying text.
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is addressed.16 Regardless of one's individual opinion as to what liberties
should be granted to probationers and parolees, including Fourth Amend-
ment protections, effective rehabilitation is an immediate and necessary
goal to improve the quality of life of all concerned. 7 Moreover, offering in-
creased Fourth Amendment protection of a probationer's or parolee's resi-
dence, although not at the level enjoyed by normal citizens, will likely have
benefits that outweigh the costs. This is the underlying theme throughout
this Note.
I. THE INITIAL REDUCTION OF FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION
A. Administrative Searches and the "Special-Needs" Doctrine
The reduction of Fourth Amendment protection of one's residence began
in Camara v. Municipal Court, which concerned a search aimed at assuring
compliance with municipal housing codes." Instead of requiring probable
cause, the Supreme Court applied a balancing test, weihing "the need
to search against the invasion which the search entails." In Camara, the
Court found that as long as "reasonable legislative or administrative stan-
dards for conducting an area inspection are satisfied with respect to a par-
ticular dwelling," the need to search outweighs the minimal intrusion.3 O
The Court still required a warrant for the search, but as long as the physical
characteristics of the dwelling to be inspected fell within those targeted
by the reasonable inspection program, those physical characteristics were
sufficient for probable cause to obtain a warrant. In later cases, as in New
Jersey v. TL.O., the Camara balancing approach was used to justify war-
rantless searches.
26 See infra notes 224-38 and accompanying text.
27 See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
z8 See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). The events of Camara arose in
San Francisco. At the time, the San Francisco municipal code required an inspection once
a year and as needed thereafter. The inspection was required before a permit of occupancy
could be issued for an apartment building. Camara was the lessee of the ground floor of an
apartment building. He was maintaining his residence in the rear of the ground floor, but
the occupancy permit of the building did not allow for residential use of the ground floor.
When the inspector attempted to gain entry and inspect the ground floor, Camara refused.
Subsequent attempts to gain entry without a warrant by other inspectors were also refused
by Camara, which ultimately brought the Fourth Amendment question in front of the United
States Supreme Court. See id.
29 Id. at 537.
30 Id. at 538.
31 See id.
32 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
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TL.O. involved a search of a student's purse by the vice-principal after
the student had been caught smoking in violation of school rules." The Su-
preme Court found that the vice-principal had reasonable suspicion to jus-.... 34
tify the initial search of the purse. During the inspection of the purse for
cigarettes, the vice-principal found cigarette rolling papers. Subsequently,
the vice principal found marijuana, a large amount of money, and a list of35
students. The Court held that the discovery of the cigarette rolling papers
was sufficient to provide reasonable suspicion for extending the search of
36
the purse to find marijuana. Although not willing to equate the school's
authority to search with that of parents, the Court found the search reason-
able with only a showing of reasonable suspicion by balancing the interest
of the school in maintaining a learning environment against the interest of
the student and her expectation of privacy.37
The Camara balancing approach used by the Supreme Court was ad-
dressed in Justice Blackmun's concurrence. Justice Blackmun agreed with
the decision but emphasized the limited context in which the Camara
31
balancing approach has been applied. In writing his concurrence, Justice
Blackmun produced a statement, cited by the majority in later "special
needs" cases: "[o]nly in those exceptional circumstances in which special
needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant
and probable-cause requirement impracticable, is a court entitled to sub-
stitute its balancing of interests for that of the Framers."3 9 The Court has
since used Justice Blackmun's statement, as he had intended, to determine
whether the special-need purpose is beyond those of normal law enforce-
ment before balancing government's interests and individuals' privacy in-
terests to determine the reasonableness of a search.40 The TL.O. decision
was different from Camara because it required only a showing of "reason-
able grounds" for the search rather than a warrant. This difference made
33 See id. at 325.
34 See id. at 346.
35 See id. at 328.
36 See id. at 347-48.
37 See id. at 339-40.
38 See id. at 351 ("I believe that we have used such a balancing test [the balancing test
from Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967)], rather than strictly applying the Fourth
Amendment's Warrant and Probable-Cause Clause, only when we were confronted with 'a
special law enforcement need for greater flexibility."' (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491
(1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting))).
39 Id.
40 See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2ooo); Nat'l Treasury Employees
Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665-66 (1989); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873
(1987).
41 See TL.O., 469 U.S. at 326.
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TL.O an attractive choice for courts to analyze future warrantless search
cases such as Griffin v. Wisconsin.42
II. THE REDUCTION OF PROBATIONERS' FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION
Although this topic is revisited later in more detail, there are basic differ-
ences between probationers and parolees. 43 Both types of individuals have
been convicted of crimes but have received different sentences. Probation-
ers have had their sentences probated, which means they are under super-
vision of the state but usually spend no time under incarceration. Parolees,
on the other hand, are incarcerated for their crimes but are released before
the end of their sentences either due to statutory provisions or good behav-44
ior. The Supreme Court views these two groups differently when justify-
ing a reduction of Fourth Amendment protection of each class•.4 Naturally,
there are also different but equally important justifications for maintaining
the respective levels of Fourth Amendment protection for each class.
46
A. Special Needs and Probationers
Griffin v. Wisconsin involved a Fourth Amendment challenge to the search
of a probationer's apartment. 47 The defendant Griffin had been convicted
of a felony and subsequently released on probation.48 As a condition of his
release, Griffin was placed in the custody of the Wisconsin State Depart-
ment of Health and Social Services.49 Consequently, he was subject to their
regulations, one of which "permits any probation officer to search a proba-
tioner's home without a warrant as long as his supervisor approves and as
long as there are 'reasonable grounds' to believe the presence of contra-50 ...
band." During his probation, the supervisor of Griffin's probation officer
received a tip from a police detective that Griffin had or may have had guns
in his apartment.' After arriving at Griffin's apartment and informing Grif-
fin of their intentions, Griffin's probation officer and the officer's supervisor
42 See Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873-75; New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987) (warrantless
inspections of junkyards); Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987) (warrantless inventory
search of an impounded van).
43 See infra notes 155-57 and accompanying text.
44 See infra notes 155-57 and accompanying text.
45 See infra notes 47-154 and accompanying text.
46 See infra notes 47-154 and accompanying text.
47 See Griffin, 483 U.S. at 870.
48 See id.
49 See id.
5o Id. at 870-71.
51 See id. at871.
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searched his apartment and uncovered a handgun."2 Once Griffin's case
made it to the Supreme Court, the Court found that the search did not
violate Griffin's Fourth Amendment rights because the search was compli-
ant with Wisconsin's regulation of his probation, which in turn satisfied the
constitutional requirements of the Fourth Amendment.
53
In the Griffin opinion, the Court first acknowledged that traditionally the
search of one's residence requires a warrant supported by probable cause.5
4
The Court then recognized that it allowed the reduction of this reuire-
ment in TL.O. because of the special needs of the school system. Sec-
ond, the Court combined the special-needs justification and the departure
from a warrant requirement in TL.O. with the departure from the probable
cause requirements when there were "reasonable legislative or administra-
56
tive standards" to replace them in Camara v. Municipal Court. Combining
these two justifications, the Court likened the state's interest in running a
school system to the state's interest in running a probation system-both
present "'special needs' beyond normal law enforcement that may justify
departures from the usual warrant and probable-cause requirements."
The use of Justice Blackmun's concurrence, as well as the use of his rea-
soning, strongly suggests that there would have to be a finding of special
needs beyond normal law enforcement before implementing the balancing
of interests approach from Camara.58 After determining the state's opera-
tion of its probation system qualified as a special need, the Court balanced
the interest of the government's ability to more easily search against that of
the probationer's privacy.
In support of finding a reduced level of Fourth Amendment protection
for a probationer's residence and a reduction in his privacy interest, the
Court turned to the special restrictions imposed upon a probationer as a
condition of his releasei 9 The Court stated two purposes of these restric-
tions: "to assure that the probation serves as a period of genuine rehabili-
tation and that the community is not harmed by the probationer's being
at large., 60 The latter purpose seems to be a general goal of ordinary law
enforcement, not just in the case of probationers, a point of greater impor-
tance later on in this Note.6'
52 See id.
53 See id. at 873-77.
54 See id. at 873.
55 See id.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 874.
58 See id. at 873.
59 See id. at 874.
60 Id. at 875.
61 See infra notes 66-96, 165-75, 212-16 and accompanying text.
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The Court used the two purposes for probationers' privacy restrictions
to justify a special need and to validate a reduction of Fourth Amendment
protection of the probationer's residence down to the reasonable grounds
standard, which was already accepted by Wisconsin law.6' The Court justi-
fied this result by citing a recent study claiming that intensive supervision
helped reduce recidivism.3 Furthermore, the Court's search of Griffin's64
apartment based on a tip satisfied the reasonable grounds requirement
of Wisconsin law, which subsequently satisfied the Constitutional require-
ment of the Fourth Amendment. The Court's approach in Griffin would
be revisited in future cases challenging the validity of searches based on
special needs.
B. The Continued Application of the Special-Needs Doctrine in other Contexts
An example of the Supreme Court's continued application and develop-
ment of the special-needs doctrine is National Treasury Employees Union v.
Von Raab.66 Von Raab involved a Fourth Amendment challenge by a federal
employees' union and a union president against the United States Customs
67
Service for requiring drug testing under certain circumstances. While this
case did not address special needs in the context of probation, the same
analysis was used to: (i) determine whether "a Fourth Amendment intru-
sion serves special governmental needs, beyond the need for law enforce-
ment," and (ii) "balance the individual's privacy expectations against the
Government's interests to determine whether it is impractical to require
a warrant or some level of individualized suspicion in the particular con-
text."68 Using this analysis, the Court found that the government and the
Customs Service had a special need to allow warrantless searches unsup-
ported by probable cause in the form of suspicionless drug testing because• . 69
drug interdiction was an important goal of the Customs Service. Under
the balancing test, the Court considered the nature of the responsibility
62 See Griffin, 483 U.S. at 875.
63 See id.
64 The weight given to tips, in establishing probable cause, is determined based on the
"'veracity' 'reliability' and 'basis of knowledge' of the tip, Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213
(1983). In some cases, an affidavit based mainly on a tip from an informant who the affiant
corroborated is sufficient to establish probable cause. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257
(I96O). This being the case, a tip from a police detective to a probation officer relaying on
just the possibility of their being guns in the apartment of a probationer is unlikely to make
a substantial contribution in establishing probable cause, much less reasonable grounds. See
Griffin, 483 .U.S. at 871.
65 See Griffin, 483 U.S. at 88o.
66 Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
67 See id.
68 Id. at 665-66.
69 See id. at 668-70.
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bestowed upon the customs employees that would be subject to the drug
testing. The Court also felt that it was necessary to confirm that these em-
ployees were free from narcotics since they were "the first line of defense"
for the public against drug trafficking.70 Again, the Court found a special
need to justify suspicionless searches and the analysis was the same, re-
quiring a finding of special needs before balancing governmental and indi-
vidual privacy interests, as used previously in Griffin, later in Von Raab, and
subsequently in future cases.
The Supreme Court faced a different aspect of special needs in City
of Indianapolis v. Edmond." In Edmond, the city of Indianapolis initiated
a program to randomly pull over groups of vehicles and inspect them for
narcotics." The standard for the searches in Edmond differed from that in
Griffin. Edmond involved suispicionless random searches where Griffin in-
volved individualized suspicion at the level of reasonable grounds to sat-74
isfy a Fourth Amendment search. The searches in Edmond also involved
vehicles, a context in which Fourth Amendment protection is relatively• 75
low when compared to the search of one's residence, as in Griffin. Despite
these differences, the Court in Edmond applied the same special-needs
analysis as it had used in previous cases involving a claim of special needs
76to search. Here, the Court was unwilling to allow checkqoints that ran-
domly stopped vehicles with no individualized suspicion. According to
the Court, the stops did not serve a special need beyond that of ordinary
law enforcement. After Edmond, Justice Blackmun's concurrence from
New Jersey v. TL.O. had been used in a number of decisions, effectively
limiting the use of special needs to non-law enforcement purposes.
Even though Griffin involved individualized suspicion for the search,
the special-needs analysis was based on the need for general supervision of
the state's probation system which was, at least in part, based on the goal
of protecting the community, a function of ordinary law enforcement.9 Be-
cause the greatest Fourth Amendment protection exists in an individual's
70 Id. at 670-7 1.
71 See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995) ("A search unsupported
by probable cause can be constitutional, we have said, 'when special needs, beyond the normal
need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable."'
(quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987))).
72 City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
73 See id. at 34-36.
74 See id. at 39-40; Griffin, 483 U.S. at 875-76.
75 See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 41; Griffin, 483 U.S. 868; Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132
(1925).
76 See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 40-44.
77 Seeid. at44.
78 Seeid. at41.
79 See Griffin, 483 U.S. at 875.
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
residence,"' it is not unreasonable that a special need, independent of ordi-
nary law enforcement, must serve an important and necessary governmen-
tal purpose in order to outweigh an individual's increased privacy expecta-
tions in his home. If such a purpose was not important or necessary, and
the only other special-needs justification was in the nature of ordinary law
enforcement, then it is not a stretch of reason to assume that the required
showing would have to rise close to the level of probable cause to justify in-
fringement on this area of increased privacy interest (an individual's home)
under the balancing test, even if special needs were found to exist. With
the decision of Griffin using special needs as a justification for reducing the
standard of suspicion needed to search a probationer's home, and with the
decision of Edmond narrowing the application of special needs by restrict-
ing its use for purposes other than ordinary law enforcement, the Supreme
Court presumably faced the application of both of these decisions com-
bined in United States v. Knights.
C. Skirting the Special-Needs Doctrine
The facts of Knights were similar to those of Griffin. Knights was arrested,
convicted, and released on probation, with his condition of release stating,
"Knights would '[s]ubmit his ... person, property, place of residence, vehi-
cle, personal effects, to search at anytime, with or without a search warrant,
warrant of arrest or reasonable cause by any probation officer or law en-
forcement officer."' ' After his release, Knights was under surveillance by a
sheriff's detective for his involvement in a crime unrelated to his previous
conviction." Although the detective observed different pieces of evidence
linking Knights with the suspected crimes, he was aware of Knights's clas-
sification as a probationer and the search condition of his probation, upon
which the detective relied when he made a warrantless search of Knights's
apartment. The search uncovered incriminating evidence. Knig~hts was
indicted, and he subsequently sought suppression of the evidence.
Judging from the Supreme Court's approach in Griffin, it would seem
that the next logical step would have been to start the Knights analysis with
8o See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714-15 (1984); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S.
573, 586 (198o).
8 See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2oo1).
82 Id. at 114.
83 See id. at 114-15 (Knights had been convicted of a drug crime and was on probation
due to that conviction. While on probation, Knights was being observed for his suspected
involvement in vandalism and arson).
84 Seeid. at 115.
85 Id. (the search of Knights's home "revealed a detonation cord, ammunition, liquid
chemicals, instruction manuals on chemistry and electric circuitry, bolt cutters, telephone
pole-climbing spurs, drug paraphernalia, and a brass padlock").
86 Seeid. at Ifz.
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regard to the special needs of the probation system and whether the war-
rantless search was justifiable in light of those special needs. However, this
was not the approach taken by the Court. The Court instead opted to use
the "totality of the circumstances" approach from Ohio v. Robinette to de-
termine the reasonableness of the search." It is logical to reason that the
Court, through its use of totality of the circumstances approach in place of
the special-needs doctrine, considered the search of Knights's apartment
as a search for investigatory purposes, as the Ninth Circuit had found." In
Knights, the Court stated, "[o]ur holding rests on ordinary Fourth Amend-
ment analysis .... 89
The Court's application of the totality of the circumstances approach
focused on Knights's classification as a probationer, the search condition
being a condition of his release, and Knights's lack of any expectation of
privacy as a probationer, given his awareness of the search condition.9 The
reasonableness inquiry for the government's interest focused on justifying
the judge's decision to require the search condition as part of Knights's
probation. 9' The Court concluded that, given the totality of the circum-
stances, reasonable suspicion of criminal activity was the standard of sus-
pected criminal activity that must be shown for the search to meet the
constitutional requirements of the Fourth Amendment.9 In closing, the
Court acknowledged the holding of Edmond only a year earlier, where the
Court limited the application of special needs to purposes other than that
of ordinary law enforcement. The Court reasoned, however, that a chal-
lenge to the constitutionality of a Fourth Amendment search, based on the
actual motivation of individual officers, would not be entertained. 93 Again,
this specific indication by the Court that its approach did not involve the
special-needs doctrine indicates that the search was investigatory for the
purpose of detecting a different crime.94
An inherent flaw in this distinction in the context of probationers is that
due to the availability of the special-needs aspect, a court may categorize a
search in the light that is most advantageous to its goals. If a police search is
truly performed in the interest of a "special need," then the search should
be justified under special needs. If the police actions stray near the realm
of normal law enforcement, preventing the availability of special needs and
87 Id. at i 18 ("[W]e conclude that the search of Knights was reasonable under our general
Fourth Amendment approach of 'examining the totality of the circumstances."' (citing Ohio
v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 (1996))).
88 See id. at 122.
89 Id.
90 See id. at 1 19-20.
91 Seeid. at 120.
92 See id. at 121-22.
93 See id. at 122.
94 See id.
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potentially raising the level of suspicion needed, the search should be cat-
egorized as an "investigatory search" and justified by the totality of the
circumstances approach. Another shortcoming in distinguishing investiga-
tory searches from special-needs searches is that doing so could potentially
lead to problems with consistency; especially when using a particular type
of analysis in one case (totality of the circumstances in Knights) that is in-
consistent with the type of analysis used in a previous case that addresses
the same issue and contains very similar facts (Griffin using special needs). 95
The concern about potential inconsistency is exacerbated since the fluc-
tuation in analysis is occurring at the level of the United States Supreme
Court. But, given a more recent decision, the totality of the circumstances
approach may be signaling the death knell for the special-needs approach
in searches of both probationers and parolees.96
III. PAROLEES AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
A. The Reasonableness Approach
To this point, the focus of Fourth Amendment inquiry has been entirely
on probationers. Parolees face even further reduced Fourth Amendment
protections, some implemented through the same theories as applied to
probationers, and some through different theories, with the most recent
approach shadowing United States v. Knights.97 In Latta v. Fitzharris, the
Ninth Circuit applied the traditional Fourth Amendment analysis to de-
termine whether or not the challenged search passed Constitutional mus-98
ter. While the defendant Latta was on parole, his parole officer validly
arrested him at the home of an acquaintance while he was in possession99
of a pipe full of marijuana. After the arrest, Latta's parole officer went
to Latta's residence and performed a search of the residence after the ar-
rival of Latta's stepdaughter.10 The search uncovered a four-and-one-half
95 See id.; Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
96 See infra notes 129-44 and accompanying text.
97 See Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193 (2oo6) (the Court used United States v. Knights
as a template for its analysis; however, it applied it in the context of a parolee (Knights was
a probationer), and held that a suspicionless search of a parolee, based on his status as such,
was sufficient to satisfy the totality of the circumstances approach, thus satisfying the Fourth
Amendment requirements); Pa. Bd. of Prob. v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357 (1998) (the Court does not
decide whether the search of the parolee is reasonable and instead holds that even if there
was an unconstitutional search of the parolee, parole boards are not required to apply the
exclusionary rule); Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.zd 246 (9th Cir. 1975) (the Ninth Circuit used a
reasonably necessary approach, but limited it to what is necessary and would not allow a full
blown search).
98 SeeLata, 521 E2d at 248-52.
99 See id. at 247.
ioo See id. Latta's stepdaughter consented to the search after the parole officer told her
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pound brick of marijuana 01 Latta challenged the search under the Fourth
Amendment.0 2
The Ninth Circuit began its Fourth Amendment analysis of the search
by first stating that the Fourth Amendment applies to parolees.103 The
Ninth Circuit analyzed the goals and purposes of the parole system, similar
to the Supreme Court's analysis in Griffin, and concluded that to meet these
goals and purposes, "the parolee and his home are subject to search by the
parole officer when the officer reasonably believes that such search is nec-
essary in the performance of his duties.' 4 The Ninth Circuit ultimately
affirmed the search and Latta's resulting conviction for marijuana posses-
sion.'05 This approach bears a strong resemblance to the special-needs doc-
trine because it recognizes the special needs of the parole system, like the
analysis in Griffin, and the holding limits the search to the purposes of the
parole system, like the holding in Edmond.'06
In addition to the Fourth Amendment challenge, Latta also argued that
the evidence obtained in the search should be limited in use to his pa7
role revocation hearing, but the Ninth Circuit 
rejected this argument.
The Ninth Circuit held that the evidence obtained in the search could be
used in both parole revocation hearings and new criminal hearings. 0 The
use of the evidence obtained from probationer and parolee searches raises
an interesting issue because there is now opportunity to use the evidence
in a way that will result in the longest incarceration of the probationer or
parolee. This vein of thought is discussed later in greater detail."° Even
though the Fourth Amendment challenge in Latta was decided by an ap-
proach very similar to that used to decide later cases of the same nature,
the United States Supreme Court in Pennsylvania Board of Probation v. Scott
used a different method of analysis in deciding a similar case involving the
Fourth Amendment rights of parolees.1 0
he did not need a search warrant to conduct the search, but consent was not an issue in the
decision. See id.
IOI Seeid.
102 See id. at 248.
103 See id.
IO4 Id. at 250.
105 See id. at 253.
io6 See supra notes 47-65, 72-78 and accompanying text.
107 See Latta, 521 E2d at 252-53.
io8 See id.
io9 See infra notes 233-34 and accompanying text.
iio Pa. Bd. of Prob. v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357,36o (1998).
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B. The Exclusionary Rule Approach
In Pennsylvania Board of Probation, the United States Supreme Court ad-
dressed a search of a parolee's residence without a warrant or consent.'11 As
a condition of his parole, the defendant Scott was required to sign a form
consenting to warrantless searches of his home by agents of the Pennsyl-
vania Board of Probation and Parole."2 Five months after he was paroled,
a warrant was issued for Scott's arrest based on multiple parole violations,
and he was arrested by three parole officers at a diner. After his arrest,
Scott gave the officers the keys to his residence, which he shared with
his mother."4 The officers proceeded to search Scott's residence without
Scott's consent but at his mother's direction."' The officers searched and
obtained firearms and weapons in violation of Scott's parole.1
6
Initially, Scott's parole was revoked, but the Commonwealth Court of
Pennsylvania reversed and remanded the case because there was no con-
sent to the search nor was it authorized by any statutory authority ensur-
ing reasonableness." 7 The Court also held the exclusionary rule was ap-
plicable because the deterrence benefits were outweighed by the costs.
The Court affirmed, holding that Scott's "Fourth Amendment right against
unreasonable searches and seizures was 'unaffected' by his signing of the
parole agreement .. ,.9 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court also held that
the search was not supported by reasonable suspicion and that, in a case
where the officers are aware of the parolee's status as a parolee, the ex-
clusionary rule is applicable to deter illegal searches to obtain evidence of
parole violations. The latter issue, addressing the exclusionary rule, was
ultimately the focus of the United States Supreme Court's analysis.
Instead of addressing the special needs of the Pennsylvania parole sys-
tem, balancing the needs of the state against the privacy expectations of
the individual, and determining the reasonableness of the search, the Su-
preme Court focused on whether the exclusionary rule should apply to evi-1z1
dence used at a parole revocation hearing. The Court reasoned that once
a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred, there is nothing that can cure
iii See id.
l1z Id.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Id. at 361.
118 Id.
''9 Id.
120 Seeid. at 361-62.
121 Seeid. at363.
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this violation.1' The Court cited its past reluctance to apply the exclusion-
ary rule in any hearing other than criminal hearings. 23 One aspect of this
reasoning overlooks the fact that, unlike the other types of hearings where
the Court has not applied the exclusionary rule, a revocation hearing, like a
criminal trial, involves deciding whether an individual will be incarcerated.
Although it would be difficult to apply the exclusionary rule in all revoca-
tion hearings due to constraints on time and resources, when making the
decision to incarcerate there should at least be the option of scrutinizing
evidence if the case demands it.
Next, the Court reasoned that the benefits of the evidence obtained,
even if in violation of a parolee's Fourth Amendment rights, outweighed
the marginal deterrent effect on violating parole officers by suppressing•. 124
the illegally obtained evidence. Thus, the exclusionary rule was found125
inapplicable at revocation hearings. The Court also reasoned that the ap-
plication of the exclusionary rule may complicate parole hearings and that
invoking it may work against the parolee in question because "the hear-
ing body may be less tolerant of marginal deviant behavior and feel more
pressure to reincarcerate than to continue nonpunitive rehabilitation."
1
2
6
Although the Court acknowledged that it was possible for the Fourth
Amendment rights of a parolee to be violated, it felt that the deterrence
of Fourth Amendment violations of parolees by parole officers would be
adequately served through "departmental training and discipline and the• ,127
threat of damages actions." Based on the Court's holding in Pennsylvania
Board of Probation, it is safe to say that up to this point parolees enjoyed less
Fourth Amendment protection of their homes than probationers did. If any
uncertainty about this fact remained, Samson v. California' laid it to rest.
Samson v. California involved a search of a parolee.129 Samson had been
released on parole in California where he had been convicted for being a
felon in possession of a firearm. 30 A condition of his release was that he
must "agree in writing to be subject to search or seizure by a parole officer
or other peace officer at any time of the day or night, with or without a
122 See id. at 362 ("[A] Fourth Amendment violation is 'fully accomplished' by the illegal
search or seizure, and no exclusion of evidence from a judicial or administrative proceeding
can cure the invasion of the defendant's rights which he has already suffered.").
123 See id. (the proceedings mentioned by the Court included grand jury proceedings,
civil tax proceedings, and civil deportation proceedings).
124 See id. at 362-69.
125 See id. 1
126 Id. at 36 (quoting Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 788 (1973)).
127 Id. at 368--69.
128 Samson v. California, I26 S. Ct. 2193 (2oo6).
129 Id. at 2196.
130 Id.
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search warrant and with or without cause."131 While out on parole, a police
officer, aware of Samson's parolee status, observed Samson walking with
a woman and a child. 3 The police officer stopped Samson on the belief
that Samson was facing an at-large warrant, but the officer subsequently
determined he was not.'33 Nonetheless, the officer searched Samson, based
solely on his status as a parolee (and the search condition of his parole), and
found methamphetamine on Samson.' 34 At trial, the court denied Samson's
motion to suppress, and he was sentenced to seven years. 35 At the Supreme
Court, Samson's case was not viewed as a special-needs search (which is not
surprising) but rather was analyzed under the template of Knights 3 6 and the
"totality of the circumstances." 137
The Court viewed Samson's case as picking up where Knights left off.
Since there was a degree of individualized suspicion in Knights in addi-
tion to Knights' status as a probationer, the question remained whether a
search based solely on one's status as a probationer was enough to satisfy
the Fourth Amendment. 3 Even though the Court used Knights as a tem-
plate, it retained the distinction between probationers and parolees. 39 This
distinction limited the application of the holding, which allowed for suspi-
cionless searches to satisfy the reasonableness of the Fourth Amendment,
to parolees) 4
Under the totality of the circumstances approach, the Court balanced
Samson's expectation of privacy versus the state interest served by suspi-
cionless searches of parolees.' 4' The Court reviewed a litany of case law
analyzing the reduced privacy expectations of prisoners who were released
subject to a suspicionless search condition in the release agreement. 42 The
case law supported the conclusion that Samson "did not have an expecta-
tion of privacy that society would recognize as legitimate."' 43 The Court
also made a notable reference to what seems to be the new hierarchy in
Fourth Amendment analysis. In a footnote, the Court explained why it
did not use the special-needs doctrine: "our holding under general Fourth
131 Id. (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 3067(a) (West 2000)).
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Seesupra notes 82-96 and accompanying text.
137 See Samson, 126 S. Ct. at 2197.
138 Seeid. at 2197-98.
139 Seeid. at 2198.
140 Seeid. at 2202.
141 Seid. at 2197-2200 (the court listed a variety of conditions that parolees are subject
to and concluded that parolees have "severely diminished expectations of privacy").
142 Id.
143 Id. at 2199.
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Amendment principles renders such an examination unnecessary."' Giv-
en this explanation, it is reasonably safe to assume that totality of the cir-
cumstances is the norm and the only time when special needs will be used
is if a search fails under the totality of the circumstances approach. The
Court seems to be giving the state a second bite at the apple, the basic ap-
proach being that if one cannot justify the search under the totality of the
circumstances, then the special-needs doctrine should be used. Following
this in-depth analysis of case law, it is important to remain aware of the
underlying problem with this approach-it is another step in the continued
and expansive reduction of traditional Fourth Amendment protection.
On the other side of the scale, the Court found overwhelming support
for the state's interest in supervising parolees. 4 And, as usual, the Court
referenced high recidivism rates, the interest in protecting the public from
repeat offenders, and the state's need to supervise parolees topromote rein-
tegration of prisoners into society." 6 But the state's interest is not supported
only by case law. The Court has found support in "empirical evidence...
[that] clearly demonstrates the significance of these interests to the State of
California." '47 But the Court misses the point. It only cites empirical work
for statistics'48 and not substance.
49
Joan Petersilia addresses a range of problems with the parole system,
one of which is that parolee supervision is replacing parolee services.1s
She also acknowledges the usefulness of a state initiative to increase sur-
veillance of high-risk offenders but later notes that "such initiatives fail to
consider parole and prisoner re-entry within a broader social context. ' ','
In addition to these few examples, the Court also ignores even greater po-
tential problems created by viewing increased supervision through suspi-
cionless searches by itself and not in concert with all the other aspects of
prisoner release that contribute to recidivism.' Regardless, the Court held
144 Id. at 2199 n.3.
145 Id. at 2200.
146 See id.
147 Id.
148 "There are three kinds of lies: lies, damned lies and statistics." MARK TWAIN, 'MIE
AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MARK TWAIN 195 (Charles Neider ed., 1924).
149 See Samson, 126 S. Ct. at 2200 (the statistics cited by the court discuss the high
recidivism rate).
15o Joan Petersilia, Challenges of Prisoner Reentry and Parole in California, 12 CAL. POI'Y
RES. CTR. BRIEF * I, *2 (2000), available at http://www.ucop.edu/cprc/parole.pdf.
151 Id.
152 See id. at *4.
More than 125,ooo adult parolees are now returned to California
communities each year. Most have been released to parole systems that
provide few services and impose conditions that almost guarantee failure.
Monitoring systems are getting better, and public tolerance for failure
on parole is decreasing. The result is that many more parolees are being
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that under the totality of the circumstances, a parolee's status as such was
enough to satisfy the reasonableness standard of the Fourth Amendment,
allowing the suspicionless search to be valid."5 3 The Court retained a safety
valve-type standard for Fourth Amendment protection in extreme situa-
tions. They did allow de minimis Fourth Amendment protection for parol-
ees against "arbitrary, capricious, or harassing" searches.I' 4 But for all prac-
tical purposes, parolees enjoy no Fourth Amendment protection against
suspicionless searches. Samson alone provides fodder for discussion of the
Fourth Amendment as it pertains to probationers and parolees, but Scott in-
cludes yet another class along the Fourth Amendment continuum: pretrial
releasees.
IV. PROBATIONERS, PAROLEES AND UNITED STATES V. SCOTT
The analysis of the previous cases is aimed at creating a general picture of
the varied levels of Fourth Amendment protection given to probationers
and parolees. The purpose is not to combine probationers and parolees
in the same category. There are obvious differences between probationers
and parolees as alluded to earlier. Probationers have been convicted of a
crime and then released back into the community under the supervision.... 155
of a probation officer instead of being incarcerated. A parolee has been
convicted of a crime, incarcerated, and then released into the community
to serve the rest of his sentence under the supervision of a parole officer.
Nonetheless, both probationers and parolees are releasees living in com-
munities, free from the confinement of prison, with the ultimate goal of re-
habilitation. Therefore, even though UnitedStates v. Scott involved a pretrial
releasee instead of a probationer or a parolee, the Court's analysis provides
a good opportunity to re-evaluate the reduced Fourth Amendment protec-
tion afforded probationers and parolees by reviewing the purposes of the
reduction."s7
returned to prison, putting pressure on states to build more facilities-
which, in turn, limits money available for rehabilitation programs that
might have helped parolees while they were in the community. This
cycle means that parolees will continue to receive fewer services to help
them address their underlying problems, ensuring that recidivism rates
remain high and public support for parole remains low.
Id.
153 Samson, 126 S. Ct. at 2202.
154 Id.
155 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PROBATION AND PAROLE
STATISTICS (2005), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pandp.htm.
156 See id.
157 See United States v. Scott, 424 E3d 888 (9th Cir. 2005), abrogatedby 450 E3d 863 (9th
Cir. 2006).
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A. United States v. Scott
United States v. Scott dealt with the legality of a search of a pretrial releasee's
home as a condition of his release. The defendant, Scott, was arrested
for drug possession and then released on his own recognizance. As a condi-
tion of his release, Scott had to consent to warrantless, random drug testing
and home searches at any time, day or night, by any peace officer.5 9 An
informant told officers that Scott was using drugs. Instead of summon-
ing Scott for a drug test, the officers opted to enter Scott's home in order
to test him for drugs. 6 1 Scott failed the test, was arrested, and a search of
his home followed, where the officers uncovered an unregistered shotgun,
which is unlawful to "receive or possess." 161 Scott attempted to suppress
the shotgun and the statements made about the shotgun because the of-
ficers did not have probable cause for the warrantless search. 163 The district
court granted the motion to suppress and the issue of what was required for
the search of a pre-trial releasee's home went to the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals. 164
The Ninth Circuit first examined whether Scott's consent as a condi-
tion of his release validated the drug test and the search of his home.
165
According to the Ninth Circuit, Scott had not waived his Fourth Amend-
ment rights by consenting to the search as a condition of his release and
that the search would have to be reasonable "taking the fact of consent into
account."' 166 The government claimed two special needs to be served by al-
lowing the warrantless search: "(1) protecting the community from criminal
defendants released pending trial and (2) ensuring that defendants show
up at trial." 16' To determine the reasonableness of the search, the Ninth
Circuit turned to the special-needs doctrine set forth by the Supreme
Court in TL.O., Griffin, and Edmond, among others. 68
Under the special-needs doctrine, the Ninth Circuit stated: "[b]ecause
the subjective intent of the officers carrying out the search generally plays
no role in assessing its constitutionality, special-needs analysis calls for an
inquiry into programmatic purposes." Analyzing the government's claim
158 See id. at 889-90.
159 See id. at 889.
16o See id.; supra note 64 and accompanying text.
161 See Scott, 424 F3d at 889-9o .
16z Id. at 890.
163 See id.
164 See id.
165 See id.
166 Id. at 893.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 Id. at 894 (citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 8o6, 813 (1996) and City of
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that it was needed to protect the community, the Ninth Circuit presumed
that protecting the community from the criminal defendant meant "pro-
tecting it from the criminal activities of pre-trial releasees" and viewed this
need as a "compelling interest."170 Ultimately, however, the Ninth Circuit
found, "[c]rime prevention is a quintessential general law enforcement
purpose and therefore is the opposite of a special need." I" Furthermore,
the Ninth Circuit presumed that "the non-law-enforcement purpose-the
interest of judicial efficiency. . ." was the primary purpose of the warrant-
less search. 7" The Ninth Circuit's analysis was critical of the government's
claim that the prevention of drug use was sufficiently important to ensuring
an individual's appearance in court to justify reducing the Fourth Amend-173
ment requirements of suspicion. The Ninth Circuit found that the gov-
ernment had not proved the connection between preventing drug use and
ensuring court appearances. Citing the Supreme Court, the Court cautioned
against claiming "special needs based on 'hypothetical' hazards." 74 The
Ninth Circuit found the proof of this connection insufficient to establish a
special need to search for the purpose of ensuring appearance at trial.
75
The final determination to be made by the Ninth Circuit was Scott's
expectation of privacy and the effect of the consent form he signed pri-
or to his release on that expectation.7 6 Scott's privacy expectation in his
home was the focus of the inquiry. Generally, the home is afforded the
highest level of Fourth Amendment protection.' The Court distinguished
between the privacy expectations of a pre-trial releasee and the privacy
expectations of a probationer as in Griffin. 78 The distinction made by the
Ninth Circuit was that the pre-trial releasee was still under the presump-
tion of innocence while the probationer had been convicted of a crime and
was still under "'a form of criminal sanction imposed by a court .... """ For
the same reason, the Ninth Circuit found that the search of Scott was un-
reasonable under the totality of the circumstances, the test used in Knights
even though Knights was a probationer and Scott was a pre-trial releasee.183
In conclusion, the Ninth Circuit held that the asserted special needs were
Indianapolis v. Edmond, 513 U.S. 32, 45-47 (zooo)).
170 Id.
171 Id. at 894-95.
172 Id. at 895.
173 Seid.
174 Id. (quoting Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305,318 (1997)).
175 See id. at 896.
176 See id. at 896--97.
177 See id. at 896.
178 See id.
179 Id. (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874 (1987) (internal citations
omitted)).
18o See id. at 897.
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not sufficient to justify the search and that the totality of the circumstances
did not rise to the level of probable cause to support the search; specifically,
a warrantless, legal search of a pre-trial releasee requires probable 
cause.
When determining the reasonableness of the search, the Ninth Circuit
relied on the presumption of innocence to explain a heightened privacy
expectation of pretrial releasees versus probationers and parolees." Under
its special-needs analysis, however, it found that the search condition was
not necessary to ensure Scott's appearance at trial."' This approach has
logical appeal because it is targeted at what is necessary to achieve the
stated purpose of the government, what is reasonable given the totality of
the circumstances, and because it combines both methods of determining
the legality of a search.
B. The Current Landscape of Probation and Parole Systems
and Theories of Rehabilitation
Before applying the analysis from Scott in the context of probationers and
parolees, a background of the overall probation and parole system condi-
tions should prove helpful for determining what is actually necessary to
achieve the government's goals and purposes. As mentioned earlier, the
president has shown concern for prisoners re-entering communities and
initiated considerable funding to aid them. The goal of rehabilitation is
a reoccurring theme in decisions where probationers and parolees are in-
volved. 18 With this as a concern, the next logical step is to evaluate how
effectively the current system for rehabilitation is working, to inquire into
the recommendations of the experts in that field, and then to evaluate
whether the reduction of the Fourth Amendment rights of probationers
and parolees are assisting in rehabilitation. If not, the next step is to evalu-
ate whether they are necessary for the continued operation of probation
and parole systems.
According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the total correctional pop-
ulation for 2004 was 6,996,500 people and of that number 4,151,125 were186
on probation and 765,355 were on parole. These statistics alone reinforce
the importance of ensuring the probation and parole systems of the country
are operating efficiently. In 2004, Kentucky had the highest increase of any
I18 See id. at 888, 897-98.
182 See id. at 894-98.
183 See id.
184 See Petersilia, supra note 17, at I.
185 See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471
(1972).
186 See LAUREN E. GLAZE & SERI PALLA, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, PROBATION AND PAROLE IN THE UNITED STATES, 2004, at I (2oo5), available at http://
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ppuso4.pdf.
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state in its probation population, fifteen percent,8 7 and the nation experi-
enced a 2.7 percent increase in its parole population, "more than twice the
average annual increase of 1.3% since 1995." If the current population
of people under community supervision is not enough to stress the impor-
tance of probation and parole reform, its continued growth likely means
that it is an issue that cannot be ignored for long.
In light of these increasing numbers, the United States and Canada
took it upon themselves to determine what elements of rehabilitation and
re-entry programs are working. 189 The Canadian study found that psycho-
logical treatment was productive where "effective cognitive behavioral pro-
grams attempt to assist offenders to: (1) define the problems that led them
into conflicts with authorities, (2) select goals, (3) generate new alternative
pro-social solutions, and (4) implement these solutions.' On the other
hand, the Canadian study determined that "control-oriented programs-
those seeking to deter offenders through surveillance and threats of pun-
ishment-were ineffective."' 9' Although the United States' study focused
on programs as a whole, rather than on general principles that worked, the
researchers came to a similar conclusion that, "increased monitoring in the
community (e.g., intensive probation, electronic monitoring) did not alone
reduce recidivism."'
9 2
Some research determined that intensive supervision programs produce
"equal to or higher rates of recidivism than regular probation or prison sen-
tences." 9 3 Technical violations associated with these programs are thought
to be one cause, but proponents argue that detecting these technical vio-
lations prevent probationers or parolees from committing more criminal'94
acts. Still other analysis found "technical violations to be a weak pre-
dictor of future criminality." '  With the concern focused on future crimes
and recidivism as it usually is, the statistic of criminal case proceedings for
2002 reveals that: "[tlhirty-two percent of defendants had an active crimi-
nal status at the time of the current charged offense, including 15% who
were on probation, 10% on pretrial release, and 5% on parole." Analyzing
187 Id. at 3.
188 Id. at I.
189 See Petersilia, supra note 17, at 3-6.
19o Id. at 3-4.
191 Id. at 4.
192 Id. at 5.
193 Benjamin Steiner, Treatment Retention: A Theory of Post-Release Supervision for the
Substance Abusing Offender, 68 FEDERAL PROBATION 3 (June 2004), available at http://www.
uscourts.gov/fedprob/December-zoo4/retention.html, at *4 (citations omitted).
194 See id.
195 Id.
196 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL CASE PROCESSING
STATISTICS (2007), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/cases.htm.
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the opposing views of intense supervision as related to successful reha-
bilitation and a reduction of recidivism makes the effectiveness of intense
supervision at least questionable. It is logical to assume that under intense
supervision, random home searches would be an available option. Since the
effectiveness of intense supervision, including random searches, is ques-
tionable, the next inquiry is to determine whether intense supervision, in-
cluding searches, is necessary.
The effectiveness of rehabilitation for probationers and parolees alike
has suffered. The rehabilitative nature of probation or parole is declining
in a number of states. 97 Though the system's stated purpose is a goal of
rehabilitation, "[the] parole services are almost entirely focused on con-
trol-oriented activities." Instead of focusing on these control-oriented ac-
tivities, rehabilitation may be better served by making treatment programs
and counseling a condition of release. 199 At least for parolees, it is likely that
rehabilitation could be better served if more focus was placed on providing
employment and housing. Finding employment is difficult due to several
factors for those with criminal records, but "finding housing for parolees
is by far their [parole officers'] biggest challenge, even more difficult and
more important than finding a job." '
Aside from heavy case loads, the decreasing efforts of rehabilitation can
be attributed to the increased conditions being placed on each new pro-
bationer or parolee.0 2 The problem within the problem is not the condi-
tions themselves but the nature of those conditions and the frequency with
which the conditions are being monitored.'03 Drug testing is becoming a
more common condition of release.204 Failure to submit to or pass a drug
test may be a violation that results in revocation of probation or parole.
However, since most narcotics stay in the blood stream for at least one to
197 JOAN PETERSILIA, WHEN PRISONERS COME HOME: PAROLE AND PRISONER REENTRY 8o
(2003).
198 Id.
199 See id. at 84.
zoo See id. at 113 ("Holzer, Raphael, and Stoll (zoo2) note that, aside from their offender
status, ex-prisoners have a number of other significant barriers to employment, including: very
low levels of education and of previous work experience, substance abuse or other mental
health issues, residing in poor inner-city neighborhoods that have weak connections to stable
employment opportunities and are relatively removed from centers of job growth, a lack of
motivation for and attitudes of distrust and alienation from traditional work.").
2oi Id. at 120.
202 See id. at 89.
203 See id. The problem with the current conditions imposed on parolees as opposed
to conditions that would serve to help rehabilitate them are addressed broadly by Petersilia
stating, "Feely and Simon (1992) argue that, over the past decades, a system of analysis
approach to danger management has come to dominate parole, and it has evolved into a 'waste
management' system, rather than one focused on rehabilitation." Id.
204 See id. at 83.
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205
two days and up to weeks depending upon the substance, in many cases,
weekly drug testing would be enough to reveal these violations without the
need for a search condition. If the need for a more expedient test arises, the
time it takes to get a warrant would not result in a would-be positive result
turning negative. There is also newly developing GPS monitoring technol-
ogy that can monitor the movements of a probationer or parolee to help
protect prior victims and prevent future criminal acts.' °6 Two of the stated
conditions placed on parolees were confirming completion of community
service and compliance with restitution obligations. Although these are
elements to their rehabilitation, they also seem to have a strong element
of continued punishment. Again, if the focus for probationers and parolees
was realigned with rehabilitation as a main goal, this technology and these
resources could be used to better achieve that goal in lieu of more permis-
sive home searches.
Although there is no guarantee that the proposed alternative condi-
tions will result in detection of all criminal activity, it is likely that search
conditions do not achieve this goal either, given the rates of recidivism.
While costs are a likely impediment to these alternatives, the president's
initiative of $300 million over the next four years may help, but this fund-
ing must be justified with effective methods of rehabilitation. Increased
awareness of effective alternatives for rehabilitation should also result in
an increased willingness to fund these types of supervision while allowing
probationers and parolees one more liberty in the form of increased privacy
in their home. The questionable effectiveness of intensive supervision on
probationers would seem to be an adequate motivator in favor of restoring
their privacy protection.
The fact that parolees have been incarcerated may make the return of
their privacy rights potentially more significant. The effects of incarceration
on an individual's ability to function upon re-entry to a community have
been documented and acknowledged for some time, making the aspect of
incarceration the primary difference between parolees and probationers.
Although the lengths of their incarcerations vary, potential exists for both.. . . . 208
of them to become psychologically institutionalized. One aspect of this
condition is a diminished sense of self worth which can occur because they
are "denied their basic privacy rights" and "lose control over mundane as-
pects of their existence .... 09 The end result is that prisoners come to
205 OHS Health and Safety Servs., Inc., http://www.ohsinc.com/how-long-do-drugs-
stay_in_yoursystem.htm (last visited Mar. 26, zoo6).
zo6 See PrrERsILIA, supra note 197, at 91.
207 See id. at 89.
2o8 See Craig Haney, The Psychological Impact of Incarceration: Implications for Post-Prison
Adjustments, http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/prisonzhomeoz/Haney.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2007).
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think of themselves as just that-prisoners. Restoring the greatest mea-
sure of privacy protection, while retaining only that level of supervision
necessary for a parole system to operate effectively, would seem to be ideal
for achieving effective rehabilitation. Using this reasoning as motivation to
restore a portion of probationers' and parolees' privacy protection, Scott can
be applied in a manner beneficial to all.
C. Revisiting the Reduced Fourth Amendment Rights
of Probationers and Parolees After Scott
Scott addressed the Fourth Amendment rights of a pre-trial releasee. The
releasee's rights, including Fourth Amendment protections, must be dif-
ferent in light of the presumption of innocence. But the analysis used in
Scott is revealing when viewed against the justifications of prior decisions
for the reduction of probationers' and parolees' Fourth Amendment protec-
tion. Both Scott and previously discussed decisions recognize that Fourth
Amendment protection is greatest in an individual's home.
211
In Griffin, the Supreme Court determined that Griffin's privacy expec-
tations were reduced based on the search condition of Griffin's release.
Griffin, like Scott, utilized the special-needs doctrine in determining the
reasonableness of the search. The Court looked at the two purposes of the211
supervision: (1) rehabilitation and (2) protecting the community. Using
the analysis from Scott, only the first purpose would survive the "'special
needs' beyond normal law enforcement" requirement from Edmond for
special-needs searches.114 The non-law enforcement purpose on which to
base special needs would have to be rehabilitation. In Scott, the Ninth Cir-
cuit found that a failure to appear in court was a crime, but the broader
purpose was to ensure efficient functioning of the judiciary."' 5 The Ninth216
Circuit recognized this as a non-law enforcement purpose. The same
could be said for the rehabilitation purpose of Griffin. While rehabilitation
can involve a crime if there is a probation violation, the main purpose is to
reform the probationer to a socially acceptable lifestyle, making rehabilita-
tion a non-law enforcement purpose.
Scott made a connection between drug use and a failure to appear in
court since the special-need search was for drug testing.' Similarly, in Grif-
210 Id.
211 See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 869
(1987).
212 See Griffin, 483 U.S. at 875.
213 See id.
214 See City of Indianapolis v. Edmonds, 531 U.S. 32 (zooo); Griffin, 483 U.S. at 874.
215 United States v. Scott, 424 F3d 888, 895 (9th Cit. zoo5).
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fin, the Supreme Court reviewed the need to search as it related to success-
118ful rehabilitation. The Supreme Court cited what was then recent re-
search by Petersilia in the Federal Probation Journal from June 1985, which
"suggest[ed] that more intensive supervision can reduce recidivism." 9
The Court was very likely correct in finding for increased supervision,
including search conditions of a probationer's home, because the Court's
conclusion was based on the then-current research in the field, which was
thought to increase the probability of successful rehabilitation. The prob-
lem is that the once-current research, relied on by the Griffin Court, is now
twenty years old.
Petersilia has continued to do research on probation and parole and has
more recent findings that contradict those used in Griffin. More recent find-
ings by Petersilia in the same Federal Probation Journal state, "[intensive
supervision program] ISP offenders were watched more closely, but ISP
supervision did not decrease subsequent arrests .... Z Petersilia goes
on in the same article to describe how intensive supervision is based on
the premise that the increased likelihood of detection will act as a deter-
rent, but then cites a University of Maryland project stating, "'[e]xcept in
a few instances, there is no evidence that these programs are effective in
reducing crime as measured by official record data."' Taking these more
current findings into account, Scott's linking empirical data to support a
special-need purpose and similar search-to-purpose link in Griffin, it fol-
lows that deterrence in the form of a search condition does not serve the
stated purpose of the special need. Using only a small piece of the empirical
data, however, as in Samson, is not enough."' 2 The Court obviously values
the opinion of Petersilia since it repeatedly uses her work in support of its
opinions.12 3 Therefore, the Court should view her work in its entirety if the
Court is truly interested in ascertaining the effectiveness of suspicionless
searches in achieving the state's interest in reducing recidivism. Ultimately,
combining the Griffin analysis with up-to-date research conducted by the
same source initially used in Griffin, the search of a probationer's home, like
that of a pre-trial releasee, should require probable cause as in Scott.
Affording probationers increased privacy protection will not lead to di-
saster for supervision and rehabilitation. First, if the threat of a search is
not a deterrent, then there is no reason to deny probationers their Fourth
Amendment rights on a special-needs basis. Second, requiring probable
218 Griffin, 483 U.S. at 875.
219 Id.
220 Joan Petersilia, A Decade of Experimenting with Intermediate Sanctions: What Have
We Learned?, 42 FEDERAL PROBATION 6, 6 (Dec. i998), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
fed prob/1998decfp.pdf.
221 Id.
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223 See supra notes 145-49, 219, and accompanying text.
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cause for the search of probationers would still not reach the same level
of protection as that of pre-trial releasees. In United States v. Harris, the
Supreme Court allowed the prior criminal activity of a suspect to confirm
a tip along with other hard evidence in establishing probable cause.114 Be-
cause there was a tip in Griffin, with a small amount of investigation of the
tip combined with Griffin's status as a probationer, the officers could have
likely had probable cause."' Probable cause is not an extremely high show-
ing for the government to make, since "[pirobable cause requires only a
probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing
of such activity."1 6 Considering the relatively limited showing of suspicion
required for probable cause combined with the ability to use prior criminal
activity to meet this limited showing, it is likely that in many cases, with
minimal investigation, the concerned authorities would have their suspi-
cions dismissed or a probable cause requirement to search probationers
would be met.
A probable cause requirement also adds to consistency covering situa-
tions that have proved troublesome. In Knights, there was the problem of
whether the search was investigatory in nature or for the purpose of proba-227
tion. Requiring probable cause prevents the need for this distinction. In
Knights, the detective had been investigating the vandalism offense that
led to the search, and it is likely he could have raised the level of suspicion
from reasonable suspicion to probable cause if he had followed the analysis
mentioned previously by corroborating a few more facts and combining
Knights's status as a probationer.2 8 This type of analysis is more in line
with the totality of the circumstances approach used by the Supreme Court
in Knights." 9 Moreover, the fact that the home of the probationer is the area
in question weighs in favor of the need for greater privacy protection.
The application of Scott to parolees does not differ much from its ap-
plication to probationers. The same lack of deterrence through threat of
search as evidenced earlier should apply equally to parolees. The main
difference is the analysis of the link between purpose and special need.
In the case of parolees, it may be of greater benefit to afford them an in-
creased level of privacy given their potential for a deteriorated level of self-
worth.'30 According to research, allowing parolees a greater level of privacy
protection by requiring probable cause would likely help them adjust to
society as opposed to impede their adjustment. Applying Scott is not much
224 United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 583 (1971).
225 Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 875 (1987).
226 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 245 n.13 (1983).
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228 Id. at i 17-i8.
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different than applying the analysis in Latta from the Ninth Circuit."3 The
Ninth Circuit employed an analysis very similar to that of Scott, but it used
the same search-as-deterrence reasoning that the Supreme Court used in
132
Griffin, which is at least questionable given more recent research . In light
of this analysis, requiring probable cause would not afford too much privacy
to parolees either.
The Supreme Court's approach to parolee searches in Pennsylvania
Board of Probation is based on an analysis totally distinct from that concern-
ing all the other cases in relation to level of privacy protection. The Court
sought to bypass the question of whether the parolee's Fourth Amendment
rights had been violated and instead focused on whether the exclusionary
rule should be applied. Its justification was that they had chosen not to ap-
ply the exclusionary rule in other non-criminal proceedings. In the Court's
efforts to find similarities between parole revocation hearings and other
"non-criminal" hearings, the Court must have overlooked the main similar-
ity between revocation hearings and criminal hearings-both involve the
incarceration of a fellow human being.
This approach also presents the potential for abuse when the search of
a parolee has rendered potential evidence of a crime. Earlier it was estab-
lished that evidence obtained through the search of a parolee was not lim-
ited in use to parole revocation hearings. 13 The potential for abuse is that
there are basically two routes that can be pursued now to render the same
result-incarceration of a parolee. If the search of a parolee is otherwise
invalid, the route through the parole revocation hearing will be pursued
so the evidence will not be subject to the exclusionary rule. If the search
is considered valid, the route of criminal prosecution could possibly obtain
a longer sentence than possible under parole revocation. It is difficult to
understand the Court's reasoning that an individual's rights are protected
the least at a time the individual needs them the most.
While Samson v. California follows precedent of United States v. Knights,
albeit that Knights is from the probationer standpoint, the result is an un-
precedented reduction of an unincarcerated person's Fourth Amendment
protection. The token protection left by Samson, protection from a search
that is "arbitrary, capricious, or harassing,""3 is transparently thin given the
relative ease with which the reasonableness of the search was determined
in Knights; a case where a certain level of individual suspicion was still re-
quired. Again, allowing the parolee's status as such, like probationers, to
count towards establishing probable cause would automatically reduce the
net showing required to satisfy a probable cause requirement but would
likely improve the reintegration efforts, resulting in a net benefit.
231 See Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.zd 246 (9th Cir. 1975).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Probationers and parolees can be allowed more privacy at home, because
their release can be conditioned on meeting with their respective supervis-
ing officers, submitting to drug testing, and curfews.23 Given these condi-
tions, and the likelihood of detecting violations, it is logical that the need
to search for a violation of probation or parole is likely small. Affording a
higher level of protection to their privacy interest would not be an impedi-
ment and would restore another portion of their rights. Allowing probation-
ers and parolees increased privacy protection by requiring probable cause
still, as a practical matter, involves a lower level of privacy protection than
that afforded to unconvicted individuals and pre-trial releasees. This dif-
ference in privacy protection also maintains respect for the presumption of
innocence given to unconvicted individuals and pre-trial releasees. Uncon-
victed individuals would enjoy Fourth Amendment protection requiring a
warrant supported by probable cause. Pre-trial releasees would enjoy pro-
tection requiring probable cause only. Probationers and parolees would be
afforded the protection through a requirement of probable cause subject to
some reduction of showing given their status as probationers or parolees.
An individual's home receives the greatest degree of privacy protection
under the Fourth Amendment. The goal of both probation and parole is
to help individuals who have committed crimes adjust their lifestyles to
become socially acceptable. The threat of search has been found not to be
an effective deterrent to the commission of crimes or possession of contra-
band.236 The prolonged absence of privacy, as is necessary in prison, has left
some parolees in the mindset of lowered self worth and, if re-entry into so-
ciety is a goal, then they should be afforded as much privacy as possible.
Since the effectiveness of the search conditions are questionable and the
negative impact of these conditions are documented, affording probation-
ers and parolees a level of privacy protection in their home by requiring
probable cause for a search is reasonable, and in the words of the United
States Supreme Court, the "touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is rea-
sonableness. ' 38
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